Alexander Batthyány writes about physicist Avshalom Elitzur's "Bafflement Argument," which contends that our very puzzlement over qualia is evidence that consciousness causes physical effects. If experience makes no causal difference, then the sheer volume of books, conferences, and philosophical arguments about consciousness becomes an unexplained coincidence. The argument forces a choice among four otherwise attractive claims: qualia are real, they are not reducible to function, the physical domain is causally closed, and our reports track genuine experience.
- Elitzur recently shifted from reluctant dualism toward panpsychism
- The "Asymmetry Proof" distinguishes a zombie's bafflement (incomplete access to its own machinery) from ours (the apparent possibility of processing with nobody home)
- Elitzur's "Qualia Inaction Postulate" names the assumption that qualia are epiphenomenal
- Allowing nonphysical consciousness to influence the brain may require revisiting conservation laws or thermodynamics
- Elitzur recently shifted from reluctant dualism toward panpsychism
- The "Asymmetry Proof" distinguishes a zombie's bafflement (incomplete access to its own machinery) from ours (the apparent possibility of processing with nobody home)
- Elitzur's "Qualia Inaction Postulate" names the assumption that qualia are epiphenomenal
- Allowing nonphysical consciousness to influence the brain may require revisiting conservation laws or thermodynamics
